GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF TRANSPORTATION
CHARGES.-PART IIl.
II.-The Right to Interfere.*
2. Public Subject Matter of Contract.
(b.) Contract of Public Service.
Transportation is the typical example of a public calling.
The common law compelled those carriers "holding themselves out for hire to carry the goods of all persons indifferently," to substantiate this "holding out" and to accept the
goods of any who offered. The.charges of the carriers thus
"common," in the legal sense; were a matter of judicial concern and by law must be reasonable. The argument which
would confine the right to interfere to cases involving contracts
of public service brings here a post ergo preopter, and asserts
that the regulation of the rates follows, because the public has
a right to demand the service. But why, pray, has the public
a "right to demand the service?"
Mr. Albert Stickney, in his book on "State Control of Commerce and Trade," makes a division of occupations into what
he calls "public employments " and "private employments."
The former including light, water, telegraph and telephone
service, also that of grain elevators and stockyards,' in addition to the business of transportation, are legitimately the
subjects of state control. The latter, which it is asserted are
clearly distinct from those in which the service is essentially
public, are among the rights of life, liberty and property guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and canno be touched
by the legislature. "As to private employments the growth
of the law has been continuous to its present condition of
virtually complete non-interference. As to common carriers,
on the other hand, the state control is practically unrestricted,
and is ample for the protection of all rights of the citizen.
The growth in the one branch of the law has been from a
* Continued from March number.
'As to stockyards, see Cotting v. Stockyards Co., 79 Fed. 679 (1897).
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condition of minute and annoying restriction to one of complete freedom. In the other, it has been from a condition
of comparative freedom to one of complete and adequate
supervision and control." '
In like manner, Mr. Justice Field says that it is not "within
the competency of a state to fix the compensation which an
individual may receive for the use of his own property, in his
private business, and for his services in connection with it."'
From these words might be inferred a positive, determinable,
and essential difference in kind between "public" and "private"
occupations. An examination of the famous grain elevator
cases may help us to an opinion as to the validity of the attempted distinction. Hunn v. Illinois3 was a case involving
the constitutionality of a statute of Illinois which declared
grain elevators to be public warehouses and prescribed the
rates of storage. The opinion of the majority affirming the
validity of the act declares (p. 13 1), "that, although, in 1874,
there were in Chicago fourteen warehouses adapted to this
particular business; and owned .byabout thirty persons, nine
business firms controlled them; and (that) the prices charged
and received for storage were such 'as have been from year
to year agreed upon and established by the different elevators
or warehouses in the city of Chicago, and which rates have
been annually published in one or more newspapers printed
in said city, in the month of January in each year, as the
established rates for the year next ensuing such publication.'
Thus it is apparent that all the elevating facilities through
which these vast productions ' of seven or eight great states of
the West' must pass on the way ' to four or five of the states
on the sea shore' may be a 'virtual' monopoly.
"Under such circumstances it is difficult to see why, if the
common carrier' or the miller, or the ferryman, or the inn-

' Page 88 of 14Commerce and Trade." Mr. Stickney passes over the
regulation of interest with the simple assertion that the reasons for that
are historical. With submission, the opinion may be ventured that the
reasons for the other sorts of regulation are also "historical."
2 Dissenting opinion of Field, J., in Munn v. Illinois, 94
138 (1876).

3Supra.

U. S. 113,
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keeper, or the wharfinger, or the baker, or the cartman, or the
hackney-coachman, pursues a public employment and exercises 'a sort of public office,' these plaintiffs in error do not.
They stand, to use again the language of their counsel, in the
very 'gateway of commerce,' and take toll from all who pass.
Their business most certainly 'tends to a common charge,'
and, therefore, according to Lord Hale, every such warehouseman ' ought to be under public regulation, viz.: that he
. . . take but reasonable toll.' Certainly, if any business
can be clothed ' with a public interest, and cease to be Juris
p;0ivati only,' this has been. It my nqt be made so by the
operation of the constitution of Illinois or this statute, hut it is.
by thefacts." (Last italics mine.)
It was supposed that this case was practically overruled by
the Minnesota cases,' but later in Budd v. New Yok,2 Munn
v. Illinois was reaffirmed and emphasized. The majority
opinion approved the language of the Court of Appeals of
New York, from which the case had been brought' to the
Supreme Court, to the effect that the right of the legislature
"to regulate the charges for services in connection with the
use of property did not depend in every case upon the question whether there was a legal monopoly or whether special
governmental privileges or protection had been bestowed; that
there were elements of publicity in the business of elevating
grain which peculiarly affected it with a public interest; that
those elements were found in the nature and extent of the
business, its relation to the commerce of the state and country
and the practical monopoly enjoyed by those engaged in it"
(italics mine).
Mr. Justice Blatchford, delivering the opinion of the court,
said: "It is contended . . . that the business of the
relators in handling grain was wholly private and not subject
to regulation by law; and that they had received from the
state no charter, no privileges, and no immunity, and stood
before the law on a footing with the laborers they emp!.,yve4 to
shovel grain, and were no more subject to regulation ti,..,
1'34 U. S.
143 U. S.

517 (1891)
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other individual in the community. But these same facts
existed in Munn v. Illinois. In that case, the parties offending
were private individuals doing a pivate business, without any
privilege or monopoly granted to them by the state. Not
only is the business of elevating grain affected with a public
interest, but the records show that it is an actualmonopoly,
besides being incident to the business of transportation and to
that of a common carrier, and thus of a quasi-public character.
The act is also constitutional as an exercise of the police
power of the state." I
In Brass v. Stoeser, Mr. Justice Brewer dissents "because
the facts show
no pratical monopoly to which a
citizen is compelled to resort, and by means of which a tribute
can be exacted from the community." The learned justice,
desiring earnestly to find some barrier which can be placed by
the courts in the way of "legislative assaults" upon property,
having failed to establish the one of "legal monopoly," 3 now
takes his stand behind the "virtual monopoly" limitation apparently set up by the decisions in Munn v. Illinois and Budd v.
New York. But the majority (a narrow one of five to four)
refuse to admit that theory as the determining factor in those
cases:'
"Again, it is said, that the modes of carrying on
the business of elevating and storing grain in North Dakota
are not similar to those pursued iq the Eastern cities; that
the great elevators used in transhipping grain from the lakes
to the railroads are essential; and that those who own them,
if pqcontrolle4 by law, could extort such charges as they
pleased; and great stress is laid upon expressions used in our
previous opinions, in which this business, as carried on at
Chicago and Buffalo, is spoken of as a practical monopoly, to
which shippers and owners of grain are compelled to resort.
The surroundings in an agricultural state, where land is cheap
in price an4 limitless in quantity, are thought to be widely
different an d to demand different regulations.
I1t would 1e interesting to know just what this last sentence means.
3

53 U. S. 39T, 409 (0894).
See his dissenting opinion in Budd v. 1ew York, supra.

brass v. Stpeer, supra, at p. 493.
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"These arguments are disposed of, as we think, by the
simple observation, already made, that the facts rehearsed
are matters for those who make,. not for those who interpret
the laws. (Italics mine.) When it is once -admitted, as
it is admitted here, that it is competent for the legislative
power to control the business of elevating and storing
grain, whether carried on by individuals or associadions (my
italics), in cities of one size and in some circumstances,
it follows that such power may be legally exerted over
the same business when carried on in smaller cities and
under other circumstances. It may be conceded that that
would not be wise legislation which provided the same regulations in every case, and overlooked differences in ihe facts
that called for regulations. But, as we have no right to revise
the wisdom or expediency of the law in question, so we
would not be justified in imputing an improper exercise of
discretion to the legislature of North Dakota. It may be
true that, in the cases cited, the judges who expressed the
conclusions of the court entered at some length into a defence of the propriety of the laws which they were considering, and that some of the reasons given for sustaining them
went rather to their expediency than to their validity. Such
eforts, on the part of judges, to justify to citizens the ways of.
legislatures, are not without value, though they are liable to be
met by the assertion of opposite views as to the practicalwisdom
of the law; and thus the real question at issue-namey, the
power of the legislature to act at all-is obscured" (italics mine).
These views of the majority are quoted at length because of
the evident tendency of the court to disregard any distinction
between "public" and "private" employments, so far as regards the right of the legislature to interfere. With the policy
of such interference the ourt rightly say they have nothing
to do.
There seems little doubt of the correctness of this position
of the Supreme Court.- The words public and private are
incapable of exact definition. When Mr. Justice Brewer asks,
" If it (the government) may regulate the price of one serv..e,
which is not a public service, or the compensation for the i!e
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-of one I.ind of property which is not devoted to a public use,
why may it not, with equal reason, regulate the price of all
service and the compensation to be paid for the use of all
property?" I he, of course, perpetrates a pelttia pfrincipii in his
c;ondition. What would constitute a "dedication to public
use" in one state of society, would not in another. The terms
are all relative, and cannot be delimited with certainty. The
statement so often made, in varying forms, that a "public use
is very different from a public interest in the use," since
" there is scarcely any property in whose use the public has
no interest," 2 asserts a difference only of degree.
3. Effect on Public Interests.
The "public interest," at the last analysis, is what makes
the public character of the service. The exercise of the right
of eminent domain is not the foundation of such character.
The gift of that prerogative is the result of a common cause.
Carriers were regulated when they were only wagoners and
boatmen. Public franchise and eminent domain came later,
as a means of exercising government control or of assisting a
business in which the people at large were concerned. Also,
as we have seen, the artificial personality of a corporation is of
itself no reason for state interference with its business, nor is
the legal grant of a special privilege. See how the simple
"public interest" explanation clears up the vexed question of
"legal" and "virtual" monopolies. It is doubtful whether,
historically, there has ever been a class of "legal monopolies" which did not arise from a prior partial or complete mo-nopoly of fact. Monopolies in commodities must have been
enjoyed before governments were organized. An individual
monopoly in salt, for instance, in savage times, would cause

I Budd
(1892).

v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, dissenting opinion, at p. 551
"Such an argument would be as strong and as conclusive

against the exercise of the taxing power. For if the legislature may
levy a tax upon property, they may absorb the entire property of the
taxpayer. The same may be said of every power where there is an exercise of judgment."
369, 383 (1853).
2

McLean, J., in Piqua 'Bank v. Knoop, 16 How.

Mr. Justice Brewer's dissent in Budd v. New York, supra, at p. 549.
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coercion of numbers-a "government regulation."
A tribal
monopoly would give rise (as a matter of fact has been the
case) to intertribal wars, and, when the tribe grew into a
nation, to national supervision. The virtual monopoly helps"
make the public interest, and that, in turn, is the reason for
creating the legal monopoly-the most radical and thorough
form of government control.
To be sure, this line of reasoning, like that which controverts the old distinction between mala prohibita and mala in se,
removes a certain appearance of clearness and distinct limitation presented by some of the theories discussed. It is true,
as Mr. Justice Brewer said, that no one chn tell when his business will become of sufficient importance to the public to be
impressed with a "public interest." "Public policy," which
Mr. Bonney thinks is synonymous with common sense, may
to-day stamp a business as "public " which yesterday was
considered "private."
That must be within the discretion of
the legislature, and is or should be purely a matter of.expediency, having regard to the average reached by a balancing
of the good to be accomplished or the .evil to be overcome by
any particular piece of law-making, against the troubles and
disadvantages incident to its enforcement. The "rights of
man " should enter into the question only to furnish a very
strong presumption against the policy of interference legislation, not at all against the enacting power.
The Supreme Court has recognized the force of considerations such as these, in three important cases: Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co.,1 Brass v. Stoeser, and Holden v Hardy ; and
1

113 U. S. 9 (1885).

This case -upheld a Massachusetts "Mill Act,"'

which gave certain manufacturing companies a right to overflow the
lands of others. The present decision, like that of*Murdock v. Stickney, 8 Cush. 113 (i85i), refuses to consider any theory of eminent domain as the basis of the statute. But many subsequent cases unite in
considering such overflowing "a taking," which requires a prerogative
right. See Randolph on Eminent Domain, pp. 387, 388; Lewis on Emii82-3. The curious circle in which the reasoner 4
nent Domain.
landed, by attempting to justify one prerogative of the state by another.
is well illustrated in this mntter of-emineitt donai-. In the tra-:, -)ui Lation cases the exercise by the raiio.,d. of the right referred to is add,.xed
to furnish a reason for ., .(.e
c';t- .i "3tes. On the othe
-d. a t-.
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in many other instances the view here contended for has been
tacitly acknowledged. The American protective tariff system
employs the greatest and most characteristic prerogative of
government-that of taxation-to build up private business
enterprises, because of the interest the public are supposed to
have in manufactures. The other prerogative of eminent
domain has been granted in aid of mills and factories, drainage
(for commercial purposes), mining and lumbering.* And the
-third prerogative," of the "police power" (which is generally used to embrace everything not covered by the first two,
and- sometimes to include them), has been used in regulation
of so-called private affairs too numerous to mention. The
widest difference of opinion may exist as to the wisdom of any
given exercise of this prerogative, but much would be gained
if questions of power should be left out of account. But if
the legislature can do these things, why may it not? And
then what of Bellamy, State Socialism, the "coming
slavery ?"

This suggestion of Mr. Justice Brewer, that it is ordy. the
courts that stand between our present society and a socialistic
reorganization of it, is very interesting as showing the judicial
estimate of the legislatures. The learned justice evidently
considers that powers such as some of those reposed in the
British Parliament would, if exercised by our own legislatures,
• shake society to its foundation and destroy our civilization,"

as Messrs. Guthrie and Harrison said arguendo in the Illinois
Inheritance Tax Case.t The real doubt behind all this is doubt
of popular government. Too many people have sat at ease,
despising the legislative authority, and relying on the courts
for protection from it under the guarantees of the ConstituMill cases, the grant of the eminent domain is frequently justified by the
previousstate regulationof the charges! See Lewis on Eminent Domain,
178, et seq.

' Supra.
3 169 U. S. 366 (1898). This decided the business of mining to be subject to such a "public interest" as to justify state control of hours of
labor therein.
* See Lewis's Em. Dora., chapter on "What is a Public Use,"
157,

el seq.
t

170

U. S. 283 (1898).
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tion. They seem to forget that the ultimate authority, rising
superior to all constitutions, is the will of the people. If
that directs, constitutions will be changed.
It may not
always be that the despised " Populists " will be confined ta
the legislatures, with conservative intelligence in the courts
nullifying all their attempts to right what they believe to
be wrongs. The final battle, after all, must be fought at
the polls. The feeling with which the so-called "masses"
regard the courts is well illustrated by the language attributed
to a labor leader recently in this city. He said: "If the life
to come should be like this life--if there should be trusts and
corporations there-they would tear up all the avenues lead--.
ing to the Throne, take the gold from the. streets of the New
Jerusalem to make a corruption fund, and, if God said ' Thou
shalt not steal,' would immediately have it declared unconstitutional." Observe the expression "have it declared." That
expresses the feeling exactly. The people who passed the
laws are possessed with the idea that somehow they havebeen cheated out of them.
The Socialists, by whatever name called, are the outgrowth
of conditions. If the conservative classes could learn that theonly permanent guarantee of individual rights lies not in constitutions or in courts, but in the vigilance with which liberty'
must always be bought and maintained; if these classes should
cease to occupy themselves merely in evading and attacking
laws, and should make their influence felt upon legislation
itself, then we should have the security enjoyed by our British
cousins, who get along very well under maximum freight ratelaws and graduated income and inheritance taxes, which are
enforced without judicial question as to their reasonableness.
To the first inquiry, "Has a government tfie right to interfere in the contracts of its subjects ?" no answer seems possible but "Yes !" All attempts to segregate common carriers
and other occupations historically subject to state regulation,.
appear failures. The carrier is no more or less rightfully
under government control than others, except in so far as he
is more or less the object of the public interest. What gives
the public that interest? No definite criterion can be laid
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down. It is, or should be, a legislative and not a judicial
question. Three of the reasons usually put -forward were
given in the preliminary diagram:
(a) Interference with Trade (including " Oppression
of Third Persons"), or
(b) Creation of Monopoly, or
(c) Rise of Prices.
All of these may apply to carriers, but the last particularly.
As Interstate Commerce Commissioner Knapp says,' "the
thing the public is interested in, after all, is how much they
have got to pay." The elegance of this expression might be
improved, but its truth seems to be unimpeachable.
III.-The Practicabilityof State Inteference with Transportation Contracts.
(a.) Early Legislation.
Carriers by common law were required to serve the public
without discrimination and for a "reasonable compensation."
The first specific legislatioh to enforce this seems to be 3
William and Mary, c. 12 (1691) :2 "And whereas drivers,wagoners and other carriers,by combination amongst themselves, have
raisedthe prices of carriageof goods iht many places to excessive
rates, to the great injury of trade; be it therefore enacted
. . . that the justices of the peace of every county and other
place within the realm of England, or dominion of Wales,
shall have power and authority, and are hereby enjoined and
required, at their next respective quarter or general sessions
after Easter day yearly, to assess and rate the prices of all
land carriage of goods whatsoever, to be brought into any
place ot places within their respective jurisdictions, by any
common wagoner or carrier, and the rates and assessments so
made, to certify to the several mayors and other chief officers
of each respective market town within the limits and jurisdictions of such justices of the peace, to be hung up in some
publick place in every such market town, to which all persons

AReport Sixth Annual Convention of Railroad Commidsioners,
I894 p. 24.
2 9 Stats. at Large, x54.

Amended 21 Oeo. II, c. 28 (1748).

May,
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may resort for their information; and that no such common
wagoner or carrier shall take for carriage of such goods and
merchandises above the rate and prices so set, upon pain tb
forfeit for every such offence, the sum of five pounds, to be
levied by distress and sale of his and their goods by warrant
of any two justices of the peace where such wagoner or carrier shall reside, in manner aforesaid, to the use of the party
grieved."
This was part of" an act for the repairingand amending the
highways and for settling the rates of carriageof goods," and
is found in Chitty's Index of English Statutes, under the title
- Highways." It was repealed in 1867"(and not in 1827, asis erroneously stated in the opinion of Waite, C. J., in Clcago,
Etc., R. Co. v. Iowa) ' by the "Statute Law Revision Act,""beginning: "Whereas . . . it is expedient that certain enactments . . . which may be regarded as spent, or havte ceased
to be in force otherwise than by express and specific repeal, or
have, by lapse of time and change of circumstances, become
unnecessary, should be expressly and specifically repealed,"
etc.
The Act 3 William and Mary, c. 12, was probably-not in
practical operation very long, if at all, in its application to carriage rates.3 Waite, C. J., in the opinion above quoted, refers
'94 U. S. 155, at p. 162 (1876).
230 & 31 Vic. c. 59 (1867), 107 Stats. at Large, 244, 250.
3

Lord Kenyon said in v. Jackson, 2 Peake's N. P. C., 185, 186
(18oo), "There are acts of Parliament which authorized justices of the
peace to fix the rates to be taken by carriers, and I have known instances
of applications to the sessions'for that purpose . . . ;" but no such instances have been recorded. Mr. Albert Stickney might just as easily
draw his lesson from the failure of this law as from the failure of those
of Edw. III and Eliz. He might just as easily conclude, regarding early
English History only, that ." all such legislation" has been "utterly
fruitless," and that modern regulations of common carriers "are on the
same line." (See first article of present series, December, x898, number
ofthis magazine, p. 730). On the contrary, he says (see State Control of
Commerce and Trade, p. 8): "Such common carriers are virtually public
servants, occupying and operating the people's highways. For every
reason, therefore, it becomes necessary tMat they should be subjed to state
control." (Italics mine.) It should seem that the history of this law
"that fWiled," by Mr. Stickney's own arguments, is at least one reason
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to this statute to prove the power of regulation, which, as he
says, "is not lost by non-user." He seems to infer a power in
the state legislature from that in Parliament, and says the fact
that the statute lapsed through non-enforcement does not detract from the enacting power.
There appear to be no statutes in the United States fixing
the compensation of common carriers prior to the era of railroad building. Then, however, numerous laws were passed,
most of which provided, directly or indirectly, for official
regulation of rates. One of the earliest statutes, and one that
is typical of most of the laws passed at this time, is the New
Hampshire Act of i844, which says (Section 13) "the rates
of toll for freight of passengers and merchandise, when the
net income of the stock shallexceed ro per cent., shall be subject
to alteration and revision by the legislature, according as they
shall deem just and expedient." The Act of Vermont (Laws
of 1849, No. 41) provided: "Every such corporation may
establish, for their sole benefit, a toll upon all passengers and
property conveyed or transported on their railroad, at such
rates as may be determined by the directors of the corporation ;
and may from time to time regulate such conveyance and transportation, the weight of loads, and all other things in relation
to the use of such road, as the directors shall determine. Provided, that the Supreme Court may, at any stated session
holden in any county through which said road passes, on the
application of ten freeholders of such county, and due notice
thereof to the corporation, from time to time, as they shall deem
expedient, alter or reduce such rates of toll, according to the
provisions, if any, contained in the charters of such corporations; but the said tolls shall not, without the consent of the corporaox, be so reduced as to produce, with saidprofits, less than
ten er centum Per annum. The laws of New York (Acts of
185o, Chapter x4o) declared (Section 28) "but such comwhy carriers should not be "subject to state control," BUt Mr. Stickney
has no reference to this statute in his book.
The Railway and Canal Traffic Act ofrx888 (51 &52 Vict., Chap 25)
provides for tLe fixing of maximum freight rates by a "board of trade."
But see infra
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pensation for any passenger and his ordinary baggage shall
not exceed three cents per mile," and (Section. 33) "the
legislature may reduce or alter the rate of freight, fare, etc., on
such railroads; provided that the same shall not be reduced
below a profit of ten per cent. per anuum, upon the capital actually expended, without the consent of the corporation,nor unless
it shall have been ascertainedthat the net annualincome of the
corporation exceeds ten per cent. per annum on the.cafital actually expended." The Ohio Act of February Ii, 1848, Section
12, contained the provision that "at any time after the expiration of ten years, from the time any such road may be
put in operation, it shall be lawful for the GeneralAssembly to
prescribe the rates to be charged for the transportation of 'persons or property upon said road, should they be deemed too
high, and may exercise the same power ten years thereafter;
provided that no reduction shall be made unless the net profits of
the company, on an average for the previous ten years, shall
amount to ten per centum per annum upon its capital,and then
so as not to reduce the future probable profits below the said
per centum." Pennsylvania (Act of February 19, 1849, Section 18) and Michigan' (Act of February 12, 1855, Sections
I7 and 35) adopted the policy of legislative regulation, but
without any limitation as respects the profits.
These early statutes are given thus fully, because their
phraseology suggests all the intricacies of the problems now
confronting us. Most of these statutes, in addition to the
language given, contain express declarations of the common
law rule, that the rate of compensation "shall bet" or "must
be" no more than is "just and reasonable." The questions
for decision then, as now, were:
(I) What is a "reasonable rate?"
(2) Granting there is such a thing as a "reasonable rate,"
and that it can be theoretically defined, what practical

1An amendment to this act was adopted March x5, x86r, providing
"that railroads in the upper Peninsula, having less than fifty consecutive miles of road in actual operation, are excepted from its provisions
and allowed to charge different rates." This was on account of the
mountainous surface of the Northern Peninsula.
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means can be found for determining just rates in particular

cases ?
(3) Granting the means of decision, who shall employ
them ? Whose determination shall be final? The legislature's, the railroad commissioners', the state courts', or the
United States courts'? Or shall the jury determine the matter
in each case as a question of fact?
(4) Does the rate in question "deprive any person of property without due process of law," or "deny to any person"
within the state "the equal protection of the laws ?"
The fourth question by the cases has been made practically
synonymous with the second, and, to a certain extent, involves all the others; but it has been placed last because it
comes last in point of time. The most elaborate attempts to
define a reasonable rate, and to discover the means for determining that character, have been made in cases involving the
application of the Fourteenth Amendment
Opposition to
government regulation per se seems scarcely to have been
'thought of at the outset, Such. opposition appears. to have
arisen largely in consequence of the difficulties encountered in
the attempts to enforce the state's prerogative with fairness to
all parties concerned.
The first careful consideration of this question by the
Supreme Court of the United States was in the so-called
"Granger Cases,"' decided in 1876. The first of these cases,
NAfunn v. Illinois, involving the fixing of grain elevator charges,
has already been specifically discussed under another head.
Waite, C. J., delivering the opinion of the court in R. v. Iowa,
said: "Railroad companies are carriers for hire. They are
incorporated as such and given extraordinary powers, in order
that they may the better serve the public in that capacity. They
are, therefore, engaged in a public employment affecting the
public interest, and . . . subject to legislative control as to
their rates of fare and freight, unless protected by their charters." Mr. Justice Field says, in Attorney-Generalv. Old Cot' Mun v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Iowa, 1b.
155; Peik v. P.,

1b.

Etc., R.. v. Blake,

I64; Chicago, Etc., R.. v. Ackley, lb.
18o; Stone v. Wisconsin, lb. 18I.

lb.

179;

Winona,
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ony R. Company:' " Whatever difference of opinion there may
have been among the justices of that court (the Supreme
Court) concerning the tests which .determine whether property.
is affected with a public interest, there is no doubt that the
property of railroad corporations, which have been invested
by the legislature with the right of eminent domain and are
common carriers of persons or merchandise, is property ' devoted to a public use.' " . . . The justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States perhaps differ in opinion whether
there can be any judicialinterference with the rates for railroad
transportation established by the legislature of a state on the
ground that they are not reasonable (italics mine), but they
agree ..
that the legislature may establish rates, of reasonable rates, unless there is an express provision in the
charter which forbids it.
This statement; as to difference of opinion in the Supreme
Court, can no longer hold since March 7, 1898, when was decided the case of Syth v. Ames,' commonly known -as the
Nebraska Freight Rate Case. I shall consider this case,
with others previously decided, both in the United States and
in England, in the next and last article of this series. The
endeavor will be to find whether any new proposition of law
was enunciated in this famous case, and to discover, if possible, the exact situation in which we are are now left in the
United States as regards the subject of the present discussion.
Roy Wilson White.
(Tobe continued.)

1 i6o Mass. 62, 86 (1893)
2 i69 U. S. 466.

